Nom EHLERS, Lars
Titre

Professeur au Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal et chercheur au CIREQ

Adresse

Université de Montréal 

CIREQ / Département de sciences économiques 

3150, rue Jean-Brillant, bureau C-6026 

C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville 

Montréal (Québec) H3C 3J7

Courriellars.ehlers@umontreal.ca
Téléphone(514) 343-7532 Fax(514) 343-7221
Page personnelleLien
Publications choisies

Articles dans des revues

  • “Sharing a River among Satiable Countries” (avec S. Ambec), Games and Economic Behavior, à paraître (16 pages).
  • “Arrow’s Possibility Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences” (avec T.Storcken), Games and Economic Behavior, à paraître (15 pages).
  • “Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism”, Economic Theory, à paraître (8 pages).
  • “Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets”, Mathematics of Operations Research, 33 (2008): 327—335.
  • “Cooperation and Equity in the River Sharing Problem” (avec S. Ambec), dans chapitre 6, Game Theory and Policy Making in Natural Resources and the Environments, sous la direction de A. Dinar, J. Albiac and J. Sanchez-Soriano, Routledge Explorations in Environmental Economics, 2008.
  • "Weakened WARP and Top-Cycle Choice Rules" (avec Y. Sprumont), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 44, 2008, 87-94.
  • "Incomplete Information and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets" (avec J. Massó), Journal of Economic Theory, 136, 2007, 587—600.
  • "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems", Journal of Economic Theory 134, 2007, 537-547.
  • "Consistent House Allocation" (avec B. Klaus), Economic Theory 30, 2007, 561-574.
  • "Efficient Priority Rules" (avec B. Klaus), Games and Economic Behavior 55, 2006, 372-384.
  • "Strategy-Proof Assignment on the Full Preference Domain" (avec A. Bogomolnaia et R. Deb), Journal of Economic Theory, à paraître (26 pages).
  • "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" (avec B. Klaus), International Journal of Game Theory 32, 2004, 545-560.
  • "Threshold Strategy-Proofness : On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems" (avec H. Peters et T. Storcken), Games and Economic Behavior 49, 2004, 103-116.
  • "In Search of Advice for Participants in Matching Markets which Use the Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm", Games and Economic Behavior 48, 2004, 249-270.
  • "Monotonic and Implementable Solutions in Generalized Matching Problems", Journal of Economic Theory 114, 2004, 358-369.
  • "Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and the Probabilistic Uniform Correspondence" (avec B. Klaus), Review of Economic Design 8, 2003, 249-268.
  • "Coalitional Stategy-Proof and Resource-Monotonic Solutions for Multiple Assignment Problems" (avec B. Klaus), Social Choice and Welfare 21, 2003, 265-280.
  • "Candidate Stability and Non-Binary Social Choice" (avec J.A. Weymark), Economic Theory 22, 2003, 233-243.
  • "Multiple Public Goods, Lexicographic Preferences, and Single-Plateaued Preference Rules", Games and Economic Behavior 43, 2003, 1-27.
  • "Strategy-Proofness and Population-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" (avec B. Klaus et S. Pápai), Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, 2002, 329-339.
  • "On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods", Journal of Economic Theory 106, 2002, 472-477.
  • "Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences: Replacement Principle", Journal of Mathematical Economics 37, 2002, 1-15.
  • "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation", Journal of Economic Theory 105, 2002, 298-317.
  • "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences" (avec H. Peters et T. Storcken), Journal of Economic Theory 105, 2002, 408-434.

 

Travaux récents / Recent Research

  • "Externalities, Potential, Value and Consistency" (avec B. Dutta, A. Kar), cahier 06-2008, CIREQ, avril 2008.
  • "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule" (avec S. Barberà), cahier 02-2007, CIREQ, mars 2007.
  • "Matching Markets under (In)complete Information" (avec J. Massó), cahier 01-2007, CIREQ, février 2007.
  • "Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools", cahier 04-2006, CIREQ, fevrier 2006, 29 pages.